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general it did not achieve this result, although it did lower marginal
tax rates on both earned and unearned income.
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sensitivity of tax avoidance practices to marginal tax rates is
estimated using four different specifications. These estimates are
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model is then used to estimate the effects of different rate structures
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The t'hximum 'Ix on Personal Service Income, passed as a part of the Ix
Reform Act of 1969, provides a tax reduction to taxpayers with substantial
earned income. However it does not, as is widely assumed, place a 50 percent
limit on the rat,e at which earned income is taxed. In an earlier paper1 I
shoved that the 'vast majority of high income taxpayers still face marginal tax
rates on earned income in excess of 50 percent.
Thispaper considers alternatives to the current Maximum Thxruleswhich
wouldbemore effective at setting a 50 percent ceiling on the rate at which
earned income is taxed. Particular attention is paid to the behavioral response
of taxpayers faced with a change in the tax rules.
The simulations contained in this paper are made with the National Bureau
of' Economic Research TAXSIM model. This model bases its calculations on the 1917
Tax kde1 file provided by the Internal Revenue Service. This data file con-
tains a stratified random sample of individual tax returns; a random sample of'
7703 of these returns was used for this paper.
The data have been aged to reflect 1981 dollar amounts. TAXSIM does this
automatically by increasing all dollar items by the percent increase in personal
service income between the two years. A further adjustment is made to the
number of returns in each income class. The TAXSIM estimates of total revenue
are within 2 per:cent of Department of Treasury revenue estimates for any given
tax year.
Fouralterntives to the present law are considered. Twoof these involve
a rewritingof the existing Maximum Thxrulesto more effectively limit the top
earnedincome tax rate to 50 percent. These alterations as well as existing law
create complicated non—linearities in the tax schedule. The TAXSIM model is—2—
designed to generate predise marginal tax rates for both earned and unearned
income to take account of these complexities. The third alternative involves a
change in the existing statutory rate schedule to make the top tax rate 50 per-
cent on all inccpme. The fourth alternative considered is abolition of the
existing ximurn Thx altogether and application of' the current rate schedule to
all income regardless of source.
The methothhogical emphasis of this paper is on simulating the behavioral
response of taxpayers to changes in the tax law. Two types of behavior are
considered: changes in effort and change in tax avoidance. Although a well
established litrature exists on the effect of tax rates on labor supply, most
of the studies do not include the affluent, the people affected by the reforms
considered in this paper. Therefore a range of' parameter values for the effects
of' price and income on effort has been used. The literature on tax avoidance
behavior is not.well established. I present an empirical estimation of this
behavior and amconducting further researchon this topic. I use this estimated
value as well as a value half as great as estimated and a parameter implying no
avoidance behavior. The reader is free to make judgements based upon his or her
expectations ofthe actual parameters.
Section 1 examines the current Maximum Thx law and the reasons for its
failure to set a top rate on earned income of 50 percent. Section 2 considers
alternative tax rules and their revenue cost in the absence of a behavioral
response. The excess burden placed on earned income by the different rules is
also presented in this section. Section 3 discusses the techniques used in
simulating taxpayer response to alternative tax rules. Section 14 presents the
results based on a range of paramater values for the behavioral model.—3—
1.The ESdsting Maximum Pax Provision
Under existing law a taxpayer qualifying2 for the maximum tax provision is
allowed to subtract from what his or her tax liability otherwise would have been
the difference between the ordinary tax liability on Famed xable Income and
what that liability would have been if a 50 percent top rate were imposed.
Figure 1 illustrates the provision. Without the Maximum Tax the taxpayer's
liability would have been the sum of areas X, Y, and Z. The taxpayer is allowed
to subtract thedifference between the ordinary liability on Famed Taxable
Income (areas Xand Y) and what the liability would have been if a 50 percent
rate were imposed (area x).In short, the taxpayer receives a tax reduction
equal to area Yand pays tax equal to areas X and Z. The tax due on unearned
income (area z) is unaffected by this rule.
However, this is not equivalent to a maximum rate on earned income of 50
percent. Consider what happens if the taxpayer earns another dollar of taxable
income. Without the Maximum Tax provision he or she would pay B percent on this
dollar. The Maximum Tax provision reduces the tax rate by the difference bet-
ween what it would have been if the taxpayer had only earned income, A percent,
and 50 percent, or a tax rate reduction of (A—50) percent. Therefore even with
the Maximum Tax, the tax rate on earned income is (B—A+50) percent. This rate
will exceed 50 percent unless B percent equals A percent. Only taxpayers with
very large earned income, so that both B and A equal the statutory limit of TO
percent, and taxpayers with little or no unearned income are in this situation.
A second complication in the Maximum Tax law which increases the marginal
tax rate on earned income above 50 percent is that only a fraction of earned
income is treated as Famed Taxable Income for tax purposes. The remainder is









incometreated as Erned Thxable Income by the Maximum x provision, the margi-
nal tax rate on' earned income becomes:
Fx(B —A+50)percent +(1—F)x B percent
It is clear that this rate is in excess of 50 percent as B >A>50.
Under existing law "F" can be computed as:
TAXINC +PSINC—TAXINCx PSINC
AGI AGI AGI AGI
where TAXINC is' taxable income
PSINC is Personal Service Income
AGI is Adjusted Gross Income
The reason for this fraction is that deductions must be apportioned between
earned and unearned income. The current law apportions deductions to earned
income according to the share of earned income in total income. The fraction of
each dollar treated as earned income rises as deductions decline as a share of
AGI (taxable income rises as a share of AGI) and also rises as earned income
becomes a greater share of AGI.
In summary, the current Maximum Tax law fails to establish a maximum rate
on earned income for two reasons. First, the tax rate on Earned Taxable Income
(B—A+5o) percent depends upon the tax rate levied on the total amount of income
received (B) percent. Second, only a fraction of earned income is treated as
earned for tax purposes. In order to achieve a maximum tax rate of' 50 percent,
the tax rate on Earned Taxable Income must be independent of B and thus indepen-
dent of the total amount of income received and the fraction of earned income
treated as Earned Taxable Income must be set at unity.—5—
2Alternative Thx Rules'
Asnoted in the preceding section an effective 50 percent ceiling on the
tax rate on earned income requires two features: a tax rate on earned income
independent of total income received and full treatment of earned income as
Earned Thxable Income. Figures 2 and 3 show how the first feature may be
achieved.
Figure 2 iilustrates a taxpayer with unearned income in excess of the 50
percent bracket;amount. His or her tax liability (shown by the shaded area)
would equal to what would ordinarily be owed on unearned income if that were all
the income received plus 50 percent of earned income. Note that the tax rate on
earned income (o percent) would be independent of the amount of earned or
unearned income received, unlike present law.
Figure 3 i1lustrates a taxpayer with unearned income less than the 50 per-
cent bracket amdunt. The shaded region shows the tax liability would be equal
to what would be owed if a 50 percent top bracket were in effect. Again the tax
rate on earned income would be 50 percent regardless of the amount of earned or
unearned income :received.
The change in tax rules represented by Figures 2 and 3 might be termed a
reversalof the "stacking" order. In Figure 1, unearned income was stacked on
top of earned income for the xirnum Thx provision. In Figures 2 and 3earned
incomeis stackedontopof unearned income. Itis essential that thetype of
incomesubject to a maximum rate be stacked on top if the top rate is to be
effective. Otherwise the tax rate on the favored income source is dependent on
the total amount of income received.
It should b noted that the reversal of the stacking order also lowers the











Taxabi e Bracket Taxable
Income Amount Income
TAXABLE INCOME—6--
alsoindependent of the total amount of income received. Reductions in both the
earned and unearned rates must be considered when evaluating the behavioral
effects of a change in the law.
The secondfeature which must be changed in order to have an effective 50
percent maximum:tax rate is the allocation of deductions from adjusted gross
income. The current apportionment based on the share of AGI which is earned
causes only a portion of additional earned income to be treated as earned for
tax purposes.3 In order for all earned income to be treated as earned for tax
purposes, deductions must be subtracted either entirely from earned income or
entirely for unearned income. Of course the alternative chosen will affect the
after tax cost of the deduction since the earned and unearned rates may 'be
different. Applying all deductions to unearned income reduces their cost by the
rate applicable to unearned income. As this rate is at least as great as the
rate applied toearned income the cost of this option in revenue is greater.
Similarly, the behavioral response to such a change would be different. If any
tax avoidance takes place it will reduce the tax liability by the higher
unearned income:tax rate for each dollar of taxable income avoided. This will
be considered in Section 3.
The alternaLive of applying all deductions to earned income effectively
levies a tax equal to the difference between the unearned and earned rates on
all deductions made. While it is clear that this will cost less in revenue it
also raises theprice of many "merit" goods to Maximum Th.x payers.
The option of applying deductions to earned income (REFORM —E)and
applying deductions to unearned income (REFORM —U)are compared with abolishing
the Maximum Ix and lowering the maximum rate to 50 percent on all income in the
charts below.—7—
ble 2.1 shows the distribution of marginal tax rates on earned income
under the five different sets of tax rules. The percentages shown are of the
estimated 2,720,000 taxpayers who would have faced marginal tax rates on earned
income of 50 percent or greater had there been no Maximum Thx. Note that the
current MaximumThx provision lowers the earned income rate to 50 percent or
less for only 7percent of these taxpayers. One third of these taxpayers has a
marginal tax rate on earned income greater than 514 percent. On the other hand,
reducing the top bracket to 50 percent will lower all marginal rates to under 52
percent; the sarie will be accomplished for 95 percent of these taxpayers by
implementing REFORM—U. REFORM—E will lower the tax rate on earned income to 52
percent or lessfor 92 percent of these taxayers.
The reason that tax rates may be above 50 percent even if that is the top
tax bracket invOlves some of the income constraints of the tax code. For
example, the medical deduction is allowed only for expenses in excess of 3 per-
cent of Adjusted Gross Income. As earning another dollar will lower deductions
by three cents, taxable income will rise by $1.03. At a 50 percent marginal tax
rate, the extradollar earned will increase tax liabilities by 51.5 cents. The
marginal tax rates on earned income may be lower than 50 percent due to the
personal income constraint on retirement contributions.
Table 2.2 hows the distribution of the changes in revenue resulting from
a change in theMaximum Thx provision. The current Maximum Thx rule gives about
60 percent of the tax reduction to taxpayers with Adjusted Gross Income above
$200,000. ThiS;coinpares with 62 percent for a complete reduction in rates to 50
percent, 149 percent for REFORM—U, and 36 percent for REFORM—E.
Table 2.3 compares the excess burden imposed by different tax regimes. The
excess burden measure I use is explained in Yitzhaki(l975). This measure—8—
Table2.1
DISTRIBUTION OF MARGINAL TAXRATESON EARNED INCOME
• MARGINAL ABOLISH CURRENT 50% TOP REFORM REFORM
RATE MAX TAX MAX TAX BRACKET "U"
under 50 0.5 5.9 14.8 1.9
exact50 6.2 27.0 25.1 214.3
50 —51 39i2 147.14 38.5 38.6 39.0
51 —52 12 12.1 28.6 26.8 25.9
52—514 0.8
514 —56 31.0 19.2 2.6 3.6
56 —60 75 14.9 0.7 i.4
60—65 11i7 5.6 0.8 1.9
65 —70 51 2.2 0.3 1.2
over 70 1.1 0.3 0.8
Percentagesreflect the share of 2,720,000 taxpayers who would have had marginal
tax rates on earned income of 50 percent or greater if there were no !"aximuxn
Tax.—9—
Table2.2
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS (coss) OF TAXCHANGES
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AGI CLASS ABOLISH 50% TOP REFORM REFORM
(ooo) MAX TAX BRACKET "U"—10—
contrasts the taxes actu'ally collected by a labor income tax with what could
have been collected with a lump sum tax and left the taxpayer at the same level
of utility. The result takes the familiar form:
excess burden =lej ti2 Wj
where e1 represents the individual elasticity of labor supply, t1 his or her
marginal tax rate on earned income and Wj labor income. The excess burden is an
increasing quadratic function of tax revenue collected. If contrasted with the
revenue collected this measure provides a relative efficiency cost of various
tax rules.This measure also takes no account of any excess burden placed on
capital income.• The W1 term reflects only Personal Service income.
The calculations assume a labor supply elasticity of 0.1 for all
individuals. The reader may chose to substitute a different elasticity for this
estimate of "ei" to get a measure of the efficiency of any one tax regime.
However, the relative efficiencies of each of the tax changes is unaffected by
the choice of elasticity.
As the calculation is a function of the square of the tax rate, a 70 per-
cent rate will level twice the excess burden of a 50 percent rate. Abolishing
the maximum tax, would involve an increase in revenue with twice the efficiency
cost of the next highest alternative. REF0R1—E involves a reduction in tax
revenue of 1.651 billion, but would be the most efficient reduction from the
view of the excess burden on labor income. As a reduction to 50 percent of the
top bracket would apply in large part to capital income, the efficiency loss is
relatively low.'—11—
Table 2.3
PROFOSAL CHANGE INTAXES CHANGE INEXCESSBURDEN EFFICIENCY
(billions) (billions)
50% MAX —14.599 — 0.380 0.08
BRACKET




REFORM —2.608 —0.368 0.114
"U,,—12—
3.Simulation Methods
This paper concentrates on simulating two different kinds of responses by
taxpayers to changes in the Maximum xrules:changes in the degree ofsacri-
ficemade to work and save and changes in the avoidance of income tax. Well
established parameter values for these responses do not exist. The taxpayer
makeshis or her decisions based upon a number of separate yet interrelated
margins: work and leisure, savings and consumption, and receipt of taxable
income and avoidance of taxable income.
A.The Effect of Thx Rules on Effort
The effect of a change in tax rules on workeffort is the combined result
ofa substitution or compensated price effect and an income effect. A reduction
in marginal tax' rates induces greater effort by raising the after tax wage.
However, the resulting tax reduction increases the taxpayer's disposable income
producing a countervailing income effect.
Using the Slutsky equation, this may be expressed as
6w
where h represents labor effort, w the after tax wage and y income. The compen-
sated price effect, s is constrained to be non—negative. 6h/6y is presumed
to be negative.
The labor supply function for individual i can be expressed as:
h1=kwyj
where a represents the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply andthe
income elasticity of labor supply. kj represents the individual's tastes.—13—
The constant elasticity formulation may be defended for changes of the magnitude
concerned here, although this specification is not plausible for extreme values.
The Slutsky relationship may be expressed in terms of elasticities:




The taxpayers subject to the options considered in this paper often have
substantial non—labor income. The compensated elasticity therefore varies
substantially across the sample. wh/y represents the share of labor income in
total income. This has a mean value of roughly 0.15 for current Maximum
Taxpayers.
Non—labor income affects the labor supply decision by altering the budget
constraint bet.ieen consumption and leisure:
(l—t)L +M=c + (l—t)(L—h)
L represents the taxpayer's endowment and is enumerated in before tax consurnp—
tion units.Crepresents consumption and L—hleisure.M is a lumpsum term
which includes both capital income and the lumpsum paymentimplied by the
progressive income tax. Hausman has termed this latter component "virtual
income".
Figure 14 illustrates how a progressive tax system yields a lump sumterm.
A worker sacrificing i hours of leisure works l tax free and pays a tax t1 on
all labor in excess of 10. The taxpayer's marginal decision is based on a price
of leisure of (i—t1) but not the full income reduction this would imply if he
paid tax on the total labor supplied. He receives an income transfer of
Ml=t10 aside fxom the tax paid tll1. The income transfer M2represents
(t2.-tl)(12—lO) +t2ll;this is the difference between the tax rate paid on theFIGURE 4
1 12 ii to
(1 t2)
1
M2last unit of labor supplied and the tax rate actually paid on infra—marginal
units. Note that if the tax rate schedule is known, the income term M is uni-
quely defined by the taxpayer's last dollar marginal tax rate. Variations of
labor supply along any segment, or between any two kinks, does not alter the
income term M.
The Maximum Thx creates a further complication. The marginal tax rates on
earned and uneaned income are different, and are altered by different amounts
in each of the ptions considered in this paper. The taxpayer faces a
consumption— savings choice as well as a consumption—leisure tradeoff. The
change in the tax rate on capital income might well alter this decision.
However, the combined price and income effects of the change produce an ambi-
guous result on'a priori grounds. I assume that aggregate capitalincome is
unaffected bythe change in the tax rate on either labor or non—labor income.
However, the reduction in the tax rate on capital income does increase the
taxpayer's virtiial income. This will tend to depress the supply of labor bythe
household.
With the exception of abolishing the existing MaximumThx,all of the
options considered here have a greater effect on the return to capitalincome
than on the return to labor income. The assumption of zero elasticity of capi-
tal income to changes in the tax rate is probably an understatement of the
response of taxpayers to lower rates and was chosen tominimize predicted reve-
nue changes. Similarly, values which suggest a highly inelastic supplyof labor
have been chosen for this simulation. Four sets of values have been used: the
implied compensated elasticity for a typical Maximum ¶Ixpayer hasbeen computed
and is indicated by ble 3.1.
Empirical studies of the labor supply of prime age males suggest wage
elasticities of zero. The households studied in this paper are overwhelmingly
married couples and therefore are likely to have labor supplieswhich are—15—
Table3.1
Parameter Values Used in Simulation





substantiallymore elastic than this. The parameter values used here imply an
elasticity of labor supply only slightly more elastic than that for prime age
males.
B. The Effect of Thx Avoidance
In the aboie discussion it, wasassumedthat all income wasactuallysubject
to tax. In fact, much income received is not taxed. Tax avoidance may involve
donation of income to charitable organizations. It may involve taking advantage
of the exclusions available to some forms of capital income.Avoidance also
includes tax preferences granted to particular uses of capital or to the
purchase of state and local bonds. Much farm, rent, and small business income
may be avoided by taking advantage of the separately taxed entity for consump—
tl.on purposes. A formal model of all these avoidance decisions is beyond the
scope of this paper.It remains a topic of continuing research, however.
For this paper the avoidance decision is approached at the margin. A uti-
lity maximizing taxpayer would allocate his or her resources in order to equate
the marginal after tax benefits from each purchase. The marginal dollar
expended on avoidance brings benefits equal to the marginal dollar less tax used
for ordinary consumption purposes. As a result, the price "p" used above to
compute effort is unaffected by the level of taxavoidance.The marginal cost
ofavoidance also is"p".—16—
Duetothe ?'aximum Tax, taxpayers face different prices for avoiding labor
and non—labor income. Die price of some forms of avoidance, preference items,
Is also increased by the xirnum Tax. This is due to the "poisoning" provision
of the hximuni Tax law which treats one dollar of labor income as capital income
for each dollar of preference income received. In effect the preferences are
taxed at the difference between the unearned income and earned income marginal
tax rates, a difference which may be as high as 20 percent. However, preference
income comprises only a small portion of income which avoids tax.I therefore
have taken the rice of avoidance as a simple weighted average of the earned
(te) and unearned (ta) marginal tax rates where the weight depends on the share
of labor income in total income, T.
p =t(1_te)+(i—r)(it1)
Itis also possible that infra--marginal dollars of avoidance cost less than
marginal dollars. This would affect the virtual income of the taxpayer in the
sameway as the: non—linear tax schedule affected it. A reduction in marginal
tax rates would lower the infra—marginal income taxpayers receive from low—cost
avoidance items and therefore raise labor supply. In order to err on the side
of conservatism I have ignored the infra—marginal transfer on untaxed income by
assuming that a1 avoidance costs the marginal price.
While the marginal price of avoidance is known, the quantity of income
which avoids ta is unknown. I have considered the following relation:
Avodiance =A(Price,Income,Tastes)
I used a sample of 7703 returns from the 1971 Individual Tax del file, the
same sample used in the simulations reported on in Section I.The taxpayer's
total income was estimated as hisor her potentially taxable income reported in
the file. Potential income was calculated by adding retirement contributions,—17—
capital gains deductions, the dividend exclusion, and reported preference income
to Adjusted Gross Income. If the taxpayer reported any Schedule E loss, it was
excluded. Schedule E gains were unaffected. The standard deduction and per-
sonal exemptions for the 1977 tax year were then subtracted as they involve no
avoidance behavior by the taxpayer.
Avoidance is calculated as the difference between potentially taxable
income and income which is actually taxed. Neither the author nor any
reader should consider this a definitive measure. The definition of what should
constitute taxable income has concerned such noted economists as Musgrave and
Pechman. I do not wish to enter the debate. If anything this estimate probably
understates"true" potential income. Interest from state and local bonds is
excluded as areunrealized capital gains, imputed rental income and the imputed
valueof househQld services. No effort has been made to estimate tax evasion.
On the other hand, some might argue that the inclusion of state and local taxes
and charitable èontributions is inappropriate. As the taxpayers in this study
are liable to have substantial capital assets which are not observed, the rela-
tionship I estimate probably understates the true effect of price on avoidance.
However, some might argue that much of the estimated avoidance is actually
the realization of long term capital gains. I have therefore defined an alter-
native income concept which excludes the capital gains deduction from both the
income and the avoidance term. Four relationships were estimated:
i) RATIO1 =a+8 FDARAT +
2)RATIO1 =cx+8 FDARAT1+Aln(INCOME)1 +Ej
3)RATIO1 =a+B FDARAT*1+ci
)RATIO1=a+8FDARAT*1 +Aln(INCOME*)j +C.—18—
RATIO1 istheshare of potential income which avoids tax, FDARATj is the
taxpayer's weighted average of first dollar tax rates on earned and unearned
income and INC0fE1 is the taxpayer's potential income. The *denotesthe
alternative concept of avoidance which excludes the capital gains deduction. A
first dollar rate was used to minimize possible simultaneity problernz. That is,
the rate used was the rate which would have applied had the taxpayer avoided tax
on only one dollar of income.
There seems no a priori reason why the share of income which avoids tax
should vary systematically with income. Inclusion of an income term in
equations 2 and:14 is done to test for possible scale economies in avoidance or
for the possibility that tax avoidance behavior is associated with being rich
aside from the }igher marginal tax rates. The results suggest that income is









Standard errors are reported below the coefficient. The income coefficient
is both small and insignficant. The price term has a highly significant t sta-
tistic and all four equations are signicant to the 0.9999 level using an F test.
The R—square terms range from 0.329 to 0.3141 which is quite reasonable for
cross section data. The exclusion of long term capital gains deductions has
little effect on the coefficient.—19—
Theusual co1linearty of income and the tax rate is substantially reduced
by the Maximum x. xpayers earning from $60,000 to $10,000,000 may have
marginal tax rates of 50 percent while taxpayers within this range may have
rates as high as 70%.In fact, the marginal tax rate on earned income falls as
earned income rises for Maximum Thxpayers and the rate on unearned income may
also fall as unearned income rises. (see Lindsey(198l)). The Maximum Thx provi-
sion therefore permits substantial enough variation between rate and income to
make estimation possible.
This estimated response of taxpayers to changes in marginal tax rates
suggests that 0.7 percent less income will avoid tax for each 1 percent reduc-
tion in the marginal tax rate. This paper also presents estimates using a simu-
lated response only half as great, that is an additional 0.35 percent of poten-
tialincome is subject to tax for each 1 percentreduction in the tax rate.
Asan example of this effect, consider a married couple withpotential
incomeof$100,000 of which $20,000 is capital income. Their current avoidance
price is l1i cents on the dollar ( an average marginal tax rate on earned and
unearned income of 56 percent). They avoid taxes on roughly 31 percent of their
income. A tax rate reduction to 50 percent would mean an increase in their
taxable income •of $14200, from $69,000 to $73,200. This is certainly a plausible
order of magnitude. The actual simulation procedure uses the taxpayer's actual
ratio of taxable income to potential income and adjusts the ratio by the
"avoidancepararrèter value times the change in the marginal tax rate.
C. Combining Behavioral Effects
This behavioral model assumes the taxpayer responds simultaneously to prices
on two margins. The share of the taxpayer's income which is avoided is deter——20—
mined by a first dollar ;rice based upon his or her potential income. The
amount of potential income is determined by a constant elasticity type of
response of labor income to the last dollar tax rate on earned income and
its corresponding virtual income. But these terms are determined by the share
of potential income which avoids tax.
The simultaneous optimizatation of potential income and share which avoids
tax is in the following manner: first, the taxpayer's current first and last
dollar prices are computed by TAXSIM. Then the first and last dollar prices
are computed given the alternative set of Maximum Thx rules assuming no
behavioral response by the taxpayer. The difference between the first dollar
prices under current law and the alternative law is used to compute a new per-
centage of potential income which avoids tax.
This new prcentage of avoidance is applied to an unchanged level of pot en—
tial income to generate a measure of taxable income assuming only the avoidance
response. This measure of taxable income is equivalent to assuming that the
taxpayer has a zero price and income elasticity of labor supply. Marginal tax
rates on earned and unearned income are computed given this new level of taxable
income. If these tax rates are the same as the tax rates under current law, no
increase in labor supply can be expected.
If these new tax rates are different from current law, a new level of
virtual income is computed and a new level of effort results. This new
level of effort or potential income may lead to a new level of avoidance if the
higher potential income produces a new first dollar tax rate. If not, the old
level of avoidance is retained.
The new avoidance measure is used with the new potential income to produce
a new level of taxable income. If the marginal tax rates at this level of—21—
taxable income equal the' earlier tax rates, a stable preference decision has
been reached. If not, the iteration procedure continues until the new set of
tax rates equals an old set of tax rates.
A possibleproblem with this iterative procedure is the kinked nature of
the budget set. Iteration may produce a result alternatively at a high and a
low price. Figure 5 shows such a possibility. The true utility maximizing
value for the ttxpayer is 'to be on the kink. But, the iterative procedure eva-
luated at P1 will place the taxpayer at 12 on the P2 segment and evaluation at
P2 will palce the taxpayer at l on the P1 segment. If this result occurs, the
kink between the two segements is automatically chosen. The price and virtual
income corresponding to the higher segment, in effect a "next" dollar price, is
used for evaluation.
D. Simulation Procedure Differences Among the Options
The two relevant prices, one applying to extra sacrifice, the other to
avoidance behavior, depend upon the option considered. For example, the aboli-
tion of' the maximum tax, or the alternative option of cutting the maximum statu-
tory rate to 50 percent involve equal tax rates on earned and capital income.
On the other hand, the existing ximum Thx and the two reform options may
involve different marginal tax rates on earned and unearned income. For these
latter two options a weighted average of the earned and unearned tax rates is
used to estimate the last dollar price.
The first dollar price, the price of avoidance, is different for the two
reform options than for the former options mentioned.If' all deductions are
applied to earned income, than the price of' avoiding a dollar of taxable income



















unearned income, then th price is determined by the unearned income tax rate.
The present price of avoidance is a weighted average of the first dollar earned
and unearned tax rates.
If deductions are applied to unearned income, then some taxpayers may see a
decrease in the price of avoidance. This will lower the share of income which
is reported and reduce tax revenue.If on the other hand, deductions are
applied to earned income an unambiguous increase in the price of avoidance will
result. This will lower the share of potential income which avoids tax and will
tend to produce higher revenues.
Lowering the maximum rate to 50 percent on all income also unambiguously
increases the price of avoidance thereby increasing taxable income. On the other
hand, increases in avoidance will occur among taxpayers currently benefitting
from the ?v.xirnurn Thx if it is abolished. The next section examines the effect
of these behavioral changes on Income Thx Revenues.—23—
4.Results
The resu1t of' the simulations are presented in 'Ibles 14.1 through 14.14.
The surprising conclusion one can draw is that it is possible to reduce marginal
tax rates and still increase tax revenue. ble 14.1 suggests that the existing
Maximum Thx provisions are probably a revenue raiser in that abolishing the
Maximum Thx will lead to a decrease in tax revenue. Even at half the estimated
value of the avoidance response tax revenues are simulated as decreasing when
the rates are increased. Thble 14.1 gives the best picture of a labor supply
response as the. current Maximum Thx yielded a reduction in the marginal tax rate
on earned income far greater than any of the other options considered. The
greatest response simulated yielded 14.7 billion more in tax revenues from the
labor supply effect alone while even the most modest labor supply response
yielded nearly 2 billion more in revenue than the no response case.
Even in thIs case the avoidance response is likely to dominate the labor
supply response. If no labor supply response is assumed, 6.6 billion more in
revenues was raised by establishing the Maximum Thx. The avoidance response is
not the usual "supply side" response commonly discussed today. No additional
factors of production are brought forth. Father it reflects a transfer of
resources from favored activities to the taxpayer and the government. The
actual welfare change is ambiguous.
Table 14.2 shows that a further reduction of tax rates to a statutory limit
of 50 percent will be a revenue raiser if the full avoidance repsonse occurs.
The labor supply response is relatively small. In the no—avoidance case an
additional 600 million may be raised, or $1.2 billion additional earned. The
reduction in the top rate to 50 percent will largely affect non—labor income. A
negative income effect on labor supply will therefore substantially offset the
extra effort produced by the reduction in the earned income rate. If a capitalTable 14.1
ABOLISH MAXIMUM TAX
TAXPAYERS AFFECTED =8143,000
CUHRENT TAX LIABILITY =38.8140billion
BEHAVIORAL HALF ESTIMATED ESTIMATED




0. 0. +3.202 —0.112 —3.378
0. —0.1 +1.373 —1.738 —14.926
0.075—0.1 +0.618 —2.563 —5.581




CUPRENT TAX LIABILITY =59.369billion
BEHAV I ORAL HALF ESTIMATEDESTIMATED




0. 0. —14. 559 —1.338 +1.817
0. —0.1 —14.500 —1.285 +1.91414
0.075—0.1 —14.225 —0.988 +2.225
0.1.—0.2 —3.995 —0.827—25—
Table14.3








0. 0. —2.608 —2.2146 —1.856
0. —0.1 —2.5146 —2.228 —1.183
0.075 —0.1 —2.289 —1.991 —1.538
0.1 —0.2 —2. 099 —1. 867 —1. 357
Table 14.14
APPLY DEDUCTIONS TO EARNED INCOME
TAXPAYERS AFFECTED =1,168,000
CURRENTTAX LIABILITY =141.596billion
BEHAVIORAL HALF ESTIMATED ESTIMATED




0. 0. —1. 6145 —0.070 +1. 399
0. —0.1 —1.552 —0.023 +1.1499
0.075 —0.1 —1.3140 +0.193 +1.730
0.1 —0.2 —1.1145 +0.309 +1.9141—26—
income response is also Included an additional revenue increase of roughly one
third the order'of magnitude of the current 1aximwn ¶Ix will result. The reve-
nue cost of a 5Ô percent maximum rate is therefore overstated by this simulation
by 1 to 2 billion if one assumes that capital income will respond in a similar
fashion as labor income.
Applying deductions to unearned income is likely to be a revenue loser. As
the unearned tax rate may well be higher than the current average of earned and
unearned rates,avoidance may well be even more attractive under this reform for
many taxpayers. Even the maximum avoidance response will produce only 750
million as a revenue offset.
Applying deductions to earned income has two benefits from a revenue point
of view. First,, it is a less costly option even assuming no response. This is
because current avoidance partially offsets non—labor income under current
rules. Under this option avoidance would reduce the tax liability by only the
earned income marginal rate. Second, the behavioral response to avoidance would
be greatest as the price of avoidance has been increase to 50 cents on the
dollar. This will mean that a higher fraction of income will be subject to tax.
In conclusion, it is likely that a reduction or reform of the upper
brackets of the tax rate schedule would be relatively costless or might even
increase tax revenues. However, a majority of the revenue offset from a beha-
vioral response does not come from an increase in factor supply. Rather it is
a pecuniary gain to the government and taxpayers as a result of less expenditure
on tax avoidance. The high labor supply elasticities used in many supply side
models of the econonr may exaggerate the benefits of a tax rate reduction.
However, the neglect of the avoidance response by any model produces a serious
overestimate of the revenue cost of' marginal rate reductions.Lawrence B. Lindsey
Footnotes
'See Lindsey, Is the Maximum Tax on Earned Income Effective?,
NBER Working Paper No. 613.
I
2Taxpayers'who are married Filing Separately or who income
average are ineligible for the Maximum Tax. Furthermore, in order to
qualify the taxpayer must have Earned Taxable Income at least as
great as the 50 percent bracket amount, $60,000 for married taxpayers,
$41,700 for single taxpayers.
3The definition of Earned Taxable Income is
ETI =PSINCx TAXINC —PREF
AGILawrence B. Lindsey
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